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Shadow Contracts
Jessica S. Jeffers & Anne M. Tucker*
This project explores side letters in private market funds. Side letters, separate
agreements between a fund and an investor, act as an invisible amendment to the
main contract. This article introduces a new use case for side letters: impact investments, where funds target social, as well as financial, returns. Using a hand-collected data set, we examine the scope and role of side letters in this growing space.
Side letters as “shadow contracts” demonstrate the Easterbrook/Fischel theories in
action, namely that parties “write their own tickets,” tailoring agreement terms to
their specific needs within the framework of corporate governance rules. Expressing
preferences and constricting manager power through contracts is even more important when managers serve dual goals. However, side letters come with costs, including direct transactional fees and indirect costs such as additional complexity,
slower adoption of best practices, and hidden hierarchies that advantage some parties to the detriment of others. The solution? Standardization and transparency.
Common side letter provisions, such as information rights and advisory committees,
should be addressed in the main agreement to reduce costs, increase transparency,
and push contract innovations out of the shadows. Further, in line with recent SEC
proposed rules, side letters should be disclosed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contracts are legal artifacts that represent the best expression of parties’ agreement at the time that the deal is struck.1
Written contracts guide parties’ actions and courts’ interpretations after the agreement is made.2 When contract terms change
through amendments, addendums, modifications, or substitutions, they are usually agreed to by all parties, attach to the original contract, and visibly alter performance obligations going forward.3
What happens when the mechanisms of change occur by the
agreement of some parties and are not made visible to all parties?4
That is exactly what can happen with side letters, also called side
agreements, which are ancillary bargains struck by some, but not
all, parties to the original contract.5 Even in contracts with multiple parties, sides letters can be negotiated between a subset of
1
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 534–35 (1998) (describing
the role of written contracts as providing the best evidence of the parties’ intent to create
a complete contract).
2
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 225 (3d ed. 2004); see also
John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342, 1387–88 (1975).
3
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 279 (Am. L. Inst. 1981); cf. David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 605, 605 (2010) (pointing out that “many standard form consumer agreements . . .
authorize drafters to revise procedural terms unilaterally”).
4
William W. Clayton, The Private Equity Negotiation Myth, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL.
67, 91 (2020) (describing how in a side letter “the benefit of the negotiated bargain is not
shared with all of the other investors in the fund” but only “appl[ies] to the investor that
is the recipient of the side letter”).
5
Id. The SEC recently defined side letters as “agreements among the investor, general partner, adviser, and/or the private fund that provide the investor with different or
preferential terms than those set forth in the fund’s governing documents.” Private Fund
Advisors; Documentation of Registered Investment Adviser Compliance Reviews, 87 Fed.
Reg. 16,886, 16,928 (proposed Mar. 24, 2022) [hereinafter Proposed Private Fund Rules],
https://perma.cc/6DPL-HSUP.
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parties in secrecy to create individualized benefits reserved exclusively for the recipient of the side letter.6 Once finalized, a side
letter between some parties changes the deal parameters in a way
that can affect all parties.7 Side letter terms create both direct
effects, like granting preferential liquidity rights, and indirect effects, such as when side letter provisions change manager incentives. For example, a side letter can include an excuse provision
that allows the LP to sit out a particular investment. An excuse
provision for one investor can change the investment landscape
for all investors by leading the fund manager to avoid an otherwise attractive investment opportunity because it conflicts with
the excuse provision, and as a result changes the capital pool
available. Side letters thus act as a shadow contract changing the
contours of the original deal on the side.
Inquiries into how contracts operate are central to larger
questions of corporate law. Consider the nexus of contract theory
advanced by Michael Jensen and William Meckling, positing that
corporations are a network of contracting relationships.8 Others

6
William W. Clayton, Public Investors, Private Funds, and State Law, 72 BAYLOR
L. REV. 294, 316 (2020); William Magnuson, The Public Cost of Private Equity, 102 MINN.
L. REV. 1847, 1886–87 (2018) (“Many of these arrangements go undisclosed to other, lesspreferred investors . . . .”); cf. JAMES M. SCHELL ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: BUSINESS
STRUCTURES AND OPERATIONS § 11.14 (identifying an exception to secrecy: the most favored nations clause, which entitles the holder of these rights, usually in their own side
letters, to see side letter terms equal to or more favorable than the terms granted to it).
7
Magnuson, supra note 6, at 1886 (discussing most favored nations provisions).
8

The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves
as a nexus for contracting relationships, and which is also characterized by the
existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of the other contracting
individuals. While this definition of the firm has little substantive content, emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations focuses attention on a crucial set of questions—why particular sets of contractual
relations arise for various types of organizations, what are the consequences of
these contractual relationships, and how they are affected by changes exogenous
to the organization?
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976). See also HENRY
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 18 (1996) (describing the firm as “a nexus of
contracts,” by which he means that the “firm is in essence the common signatory of a group
of contracts” among various factors of production); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of
Directors as Nexus of Contracts: A Critique of Gulati, Klein & Zolt’s “Connected Contracts”
Model, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 18 (2002); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819,
819–23 (1999); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1193
(1991).

262

The University of Chicago Business Law Review

[Vol. 1:259

view corporate boards of directors as mediating hierarchies
tasked with balancing the interests of contract holders.9 Further
still, corporations are formed by filing articles of incorporation,
which courts treat and interpret as contracts, supplemented by
bylaws and other corporate contracts.10 Thus, corporate law’s
most central questions are resolved using standard contract-law
principles.11
Easterbrook and Fischel famously extended and intertwined
corporate and contract law theories, arguing that enabling corporate law statutes in each state provide a loose framework within
which parties can dictate their own preferences, resource allocations, and information rights through contracts.12 They conclude
that corporate law shouldn’t be more robust because parties can
“write their own tickets” and set the rules as they wish, via contracts governing corporate actions.13 They offered a party-agnostic
theory of contract primacy as a powerful explanatory framework
in corporate law.14 Thus, contracts are central to broader questions of corporate law, as well as economics. Side letters embody
the open-ended nature of contracting theorized by Easterbrook
and Fischel bounded only by creativity, party resources, and judicial interpretation.

9
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250–51 (1999).
10 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 116 (Del. 2020) (“[R]ecognizing that corporate charters are contracts among a corporation’s stockholders, stockholder-approved
charter amendments are given great respect under our law.”); see also ESG Cap. Partners
II, LP v. Passport Special Opportunities Master Fund, LP, No. CV 11053, 2015 WL
9060982, at *13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2015) (holding a general partner lacked authority, under
the partnership agreement, to subsequently grant prohibited rights to select investors).
11 Id.; see also Magnuson, supra note 6, at 1875 (“[I]nvestor rights are largely a creature of contract law, and not state or federal law as one finds with publicly listed companies.”).
12 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 2 (1996) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE];
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1416, 1417–18 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Contract].
13 Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Contract, supra note 12, at 1417–18.
14 The phrase contract primacy was used by Judge Easterbrook at the University of
Chicago Symposium: The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at Thirty: A Retrospective
on the Work of Easterbrook and Fischel (March 25, 2022). Contract primacy offers an alternative framework to shareholder primacy and director primacy theories advanced in
the corporate law literature. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005) (arguing for increased shareholder
power to hold managers accountable and improve corporate performance); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735
(2006) (arguing for continued rules that place directors largely in control of corporations
with limited shareholder voting rights).
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Side letters also typify some of the inherent tensions and contradictions that are central in the contract literature. For example, by design, side letters are modular, meaning divided into
standalone segments within the agreement and separate from the
main Limited Partnership Agreement (LPA).15 But, side letters
are also integrated with the LPA through cross references.16 Even
though highly tailored to investor needs,17 side letters share common themes18 and amend boilerplate19 in the LPA.20 The term
15 Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1176, 1196 (2006); Spencer Williams, Contracts as Systems, 45 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 219, 237–38 (2021).
16 Smith, supra note 15, at 1189 (cross referencing works against modularity and
instead creates interdependence); see also Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal
Structure, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 279, 305 (2018) (“Integration can be understood as the opposite of modularity—an integrated system has direct connections between the various
constituent units. Most often, separate components are purpose-built to work together,
and a change in one part causes changes in another.”). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at § 209(3) (“Where the parties reduce an agreement to a
writing which in view of its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is established by other
evidence that the writing did not constitute a final expression.”).
17 See, e.g., Ola Bengtsson & Dan Bernhardt, Different Problem, Same Solution: Contract-Specialization in Venture Capital, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 396, 397 (2014) (describing findings that VCs appropriately tailored financial contracts to maximize compensation, reputation, and future fund-raising ability).
18 Standard price, payment terms, duration, delivery terms, and many others gap
fillers in the law promote standardized contract language. See Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389,
394 (2004) (first citing U.C.C. § 2–204 (2002); and then citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at § 33); Jeremy McClane, Boilerplate Semantics: Judging Natural Language in Standard Deal Contracts, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 595, 610–624 (2020) (describing different contract clauses like change control and pari passu).
19 For a discussion of such boilerplate language, see Smith, supra note 15; Michelle
E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1105, 1107 (2006) (arguing that boilerplate terms carry less litigation uncertainty and
therefore reduce transaction costs); MITU GULATI & ROBERT SCOTT, THE 3 ½ MINUTE
TRANSACTION 2–3 (2012) (discussing the widespread use of a boilerplate pari passu term
in sovereign bond contracts); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
CAL. L. REV. 261, 262 (1985) (noting that default contract terms reduce transaction costs
by providing parties with standardized and generally applicable “preformulations”).
20 For example, see standard side letter language:

In connection with the investment by the Investor in XX, an X limited partnership (the “Partnership”) which is constituted pursuant to the limited partnership
agreement dated X, as amended and restated on X and as further amended, restated or modified from time to time (the “Partnership Agreement”) and as an
inducement for investment by the Investor in the Partnership, the General Partner has agreed to provide the Investor with this letter agreement (this “Side
Letter”), which grants certain rights and benefits to the Investor with respect to
his investment in the Partnership. This Side Letter shall supplement the terms
of the Partnership Agreement.
Side Letter Doc. 39 (on file with authors).
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“contract” does not even have a singular meaning. For example, a
side letter is a standalone agreement, but can only be understood
as part of a “bundle” of agreements related to the investment.21 In
private market funds, the “bundle” commonly includes the LPA,
investor subscription agreements, and side letters. Thus, studying side letters adds depth to current debates about contract design and contracts’ role in shaping corporate theory. Further still,
contracts are a useful vehicle to examine the power of private, forprofit actors to contribute solutions to existential questions of climate risk, social inequities, and sustainability.22 In prior work,
we studied impact investment contracts23 to explore greenwashing and contracting practices that align manager incentives to
serve dual goals, e.g., profit and purpose.24 Contracts morph and
change as circumstances require, and we see evidence of their
changing in response to new goals with tailored provisions in side
letters. Impact funds are best understood as a subset of private
market funds, making our findings relevant to both literatures.25
In this paper, we introduce a novel data set of 79 side letters
to impact investment agreements, part of a broader effort by the
Impact Finance Research Consortium (IFRC) to gather legal, financial, and other information on the performance and structure
of impact investing funds.26
This article has three main contributions. First, we shine a
light on an understudied aspect of contracting: side letters. Side
letters are extremely common and increasingly complex. Yet few
academic articles highlight their role in shaping contractual relationships.27 We connect our findings to broader themes in
21 Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex
Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1418–23 (2016).
22 See, e.g., Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note 5, at 16,930 (describing “excuse
rights” to shield certain investors from contributing money to portfolio companies that
violate the investor’s “environmental, social, or governance standards”).
23 The Global Impact Investing Network defines impact investing as “investments
made with the intention to generate positive, measurable social and environmental impact
alongside a financial return. Impact investments can be made in both emerging and developed markets and target a range of returns from below market to market rate, depending on investors’ strategic goals.” What You Need to Know about Impact Investing, GLOB.
IMPACT INV. NETWORK, https://perma.cc/PA32-ZFLU (last visited Feb. 8, 2022).
24 Christopher Geczy et al., Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of
Impact Investing, 142 J. FIN. ECON. 697 (2021).
25 Id. at 697.
26 See IMPACT FIN. RSCH. CONSORTIUM, https://perma.cc/8NBV-SLR2 (last visited
Feb. 8, 2022).
27 Helpful published works include Clayton, supra note 4; Clayton, supra note 6; and
Magnuson, supra note 6. See also Kenneth Ayotte et al., Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 NW.
L. REV. 255 (2017) (analyzing side agreements between creditors in bankruptcy proceedings). Professors Elisabeth DeFontenay and Yaron Nili have a to-date unpublished
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contracts, impact investing, and corporate law. We argue that
side letters exemplify the Easterbrook and Fischel notion that
corporate parties “write their own tickets” through contracts.
Second, we present data on a case study of impact investment
side letters alongside interview insights. These data show that
side letters help investors document and protect preferences. For
example, we find that investors negotiate for information rights
and advisory committees that can help ensure their desired balance between dual goals. Confidentiality and other rights are also
tailored to fit investors’ mandates, such as carve-outs for public
institutions who require transparency to their constituents.
Third, we demonstrate the presence of a trade-off inherent to
the use of side letters and propose solutions. Side letters allow
funds to promise what they are able to deliver, and for investors
to demand what they value.28 At the same time, increasingly complex and tailored contracts can generate substantial transaction
costs. When terms are negotiated in the “shadows,” side letters
can also result in hidden hierarchies and hamper the adoption of
best practices.29 These trade-offs are heightened in settings with
heterogeneous investors and emerging best practices, as is the
case in impact investing. The impact investment setting compounds transaction costs by reducing the pool of capital that can
be invested for impact.
One solution to the cost of side letters is to bring more of the
side letter terms out of the shadows and into the main agreements. Our analysis documents variation in language and length
of side letter provisions, but also demonstrates common themes
in side letter negotiations around information rights, advisory
committees, and confidentiality carve outs, among other terms. If
most impact deals have a side letter (or more) negotiating these
empirical study drawing on over 250 side letters in private market deals. Elisabeth de
Fontenay & Yaron Nili, Side Letter Governance, WASH U. L. REV. (forthcoming),
https://perma.cc/8B38-WSSJ.
28

Investors part with their money willingly, putting dollars in equities instead of
bonds or banks or land or gold because they believe the returns of equities more
attractive. . . . Firms begin small in growth. They must attract customers and
investors by promising and delivering what those people value. [Firms] that do
not do so will not survive.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 4.
29 The SEC supported its proposed side letter disclosure rule stating that “[i]ncreased
transparency would better inform investors regarding the breadth of preferential treatment, the potential for those terms to affect their investment in the private fund, and the
potential costs (including compliance costs) associated with these preferential terms.” Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note 5, at 16,930.
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terms, then the LPA and subscription agreement, not a side letter, should address them.
Our article proceeds as follows: Section II describes side letters in private market deals generally; Section III introduces our
case study and data; Section IV discusses the costs and implications of side letter practices sending with recommendations; and
Section V briefly concludes.
II. SIDE LETTERS
Side letters are used in a variety of settings like collective
bargaining or other employee union agreements,30 investment
banking contracts,31 and a host of other transactions. One arena
where side letters are the rule, rather than the exception, is in
private equity.32 Side letters tailor investor rights,33 facilitate investments by governments and pensions,34 and authorize ancillary services to funds such as lending agreements.35
This paper discusses side letters in impact investing, a subset
of private equity in which funds target social as well as financial
returns. In the section below, we describe the landscape of side
letters in private equity in general and then in impact investing
specifically.
A. Private Market Side Letters
Side letters change main agreements in one of three ways: (1)
clarifying terms, (2) correcting or changing existing terms, or (3)
30 See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v. United Transp. Union,
No. 10CV1532, 2011 WL 4478495, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2011), aff’d, 700 F.3d 891
(6th Cir. 2012) (interpreting two side letter agreements that modified a 1996 collective
bargaining agreement and effectively determined employee rank for the positions covered
in the side letter).
31 Red Zone LLC v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 994 N.Y.S.2d 764, 769
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (litigating a side letter to an investment banking agreement that
reduced the representation services from $10 million to $2 million if the investment bank
facilitated a proxy contest rather than a tender offer).
32 See, e.g., Ian Levin & Kevin Scanlan, The Downside of Side Letters, 7 J. INV.
COMPLIANCE 43, 43–47 (2006) (noting that common practice of side letters in private equity in 2006); Clayton, supra note 4, at 91 (“[I]t is extremely common for large private
equity fund investors to negotiate for various forms of individualized benefits in private
equity funds.”). For a primer on private equity, see PRIV. EQUITY RSCH. CONSORTIUM &
INST. FOR PRIV. CAP., DEBT AND LEVERAGE IN PRIVATE EQUITY: A SURVEY OF EXISTING
RESULTS AND NEW FINDINGS (2021), https://perma.cc/M9QK-WEBY.
33 Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Fund Governance, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 141, 170
(2013); see also Magnuson, supra note 6, at 1875.
34 Clayton, supra note 6, at 294, 305.
35 Mark C. Dempsey & Kristin M. Rylko, Developing Side Letter Issues, MAYER
BROWN (2019), https://perma.cc/AVT3-FG6J.
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adding terms reflecting a new consensus between the parties.36 In
practice, side letters in private equity agreements reallocate
power and refine rights that generate both efficiencies and costs.
For example, increased flexibility and targeted negotiations are
two efficiencies.37 On the other hand, side letters introduce additional complexity, stall development of best practices in LPAs and
usher in hidden hierarchies, as well as extract costs.38 Before
turning to the data, we first describe the landscape in which side
letters emerge, and the dynamics that fueled their growth.
We start with the main appeal of side letters: low cost, flexibility,39 and bespoke tailoring. In private equity, side letters cater
to and incorporate the idiosyncratic needs of large investors.40 For
example, when a pension plan negotiates a fee discount, changes
must be made to the investment agreement for the fund to secure
the capital.41 Amendments and modifications or a wholesale revision to the investment agreement would implement the change.
But these approaches are costly, and it is risky to open the whole
deal to renegotiation. Side letters offer a tactical advantage: lower
transaction costs.42 In theory, negotiating a limited set of deal
points in a side letter involves less time and money than a formal
amendment process open to more investors and renegotiations.43

36 Tae Jung Park, The Uses and Advantages of Side Letters in the Investment Chapters in Preferential Trade Agreements, 12 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 84, 87 (2021); see also
Dempsey & Rylko, supra note 35.
37 Id.
38 “[S]ide letters can amend, supplement, or even contradict, the terms that are provided in the limited partnership agreement. Through the negotiation of these side letters,
preferential treatment is often given to repeat investors or large institutional clients.”
Magnuson, supra note 6, at 1886 (footnote omitted). On this issue, the SEC found the
following:

In granting preferential liquidity rights to a large investor, the adviser stands
to benefit because its fees increase as fund assets under management increase.
As noted above, the adviser attracts preferred investors to invest in the fund by
offering preferential terms, such as more favorable liquidity rights. While the
fund also may experience some benefits, including the ability to attract additional investors and to spread expenses over a broader investor and asset base,
there are scenarios where the preferential liquidity terms harm the fund and
other investors.
Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note 5, at 16,929.
39 Park, supra note 36, at 87–88.
40 Clayton, supra note 4, at 70.
41 Clayton, supra note 6, at 316.
42 Park, supra note 36, at 87.
43 Id.; see also Dempsey & Rylko, supra note 35.
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While we later show that some side letters are bloated, within our
case study, the majority of our side letters are 10 pages or less.44
Side letters are also flexible, reflecting last minute and afterthe-fund-is-formed deal adaptations necessary to attract capital.45
This is particularly true with large investors, those able and willing to invest cornerstone capital necessary to make a fund.46
Large investors hold negotiation power because of their influence
over whether the fund raises the minimum capital amount to
form. Large investors in one fund are also potential investors in
sister or subsequent funds.47 Importantly, large investors can demand idiosyncratic terms within side letters because the capital
they invest will foot the legal bill of contract negotiation.48
Side letters are not without their own costs, such as perpetuating poor-quality LPAs. For example, when large investors negotiate for their own private benefits, they are less sensitive to
the poor quality of LPA protections that extend to other investors.49 Side letters create a hidden hierarchy.50 Suboptimal LPA
terms, such as lack of information reporting or participatory governance, can be repaired in a side letter but left in the main agreement, exposing other investors to weak protections and perpetuating “best practices” that are anything but.51 Some side letter
provisions, once complied with for one investor, often cost little to
extend the privilege to other investors. Take information rights
for example: once a fund produces information for one investor,

44 See Compiled Side Letter Data File (on file with authors). Our findings are in line
with the side letter lengths observed by Professors de Fontenay and Nili, who documented
growth in recent side letters to an average of 8.5 pages. de Fontenay and Nili, supra note
27, at 33.
45 Clayton, supra note 4, at 88 (“[S]ome amount of flexibility and discretion was
needed.”).
46 Id. at 90 (“Large investors generally have greater bargaining power with private
equity fund managers than smaller investors . . . .”). In the proposed rules, the SEC identified funds’ incentives to negotiate side letters with “large” investors to induce their investment in the fund or in future funds. Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note 5, at
16,928–29.
47 Qualitative Interview Session 1 (Nov. 6, 2020) (on file with author).
48 Clayton, supra note 4, at 109–10; see also Magnuson, supra note 6, at 1887.
49 Clayton, supra note 4, at 91.
50 “The very fact that [information rights] complexity is not included in the central
LPA document creates the circumstances conducive to divergence. This state of affairs is
clearly traced back to the GPs refusal to provide information transparency not just to the
public, but even amongst their investor base. . . . [E]qual access to the enhanced level of
information made available to DFIs presents a first, straightforward opportunity to simplify and standardize and therefore deliver significant time and cost savings.”
Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 5.
51 Clayton, supra note 4, at 96–97.
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providing it to all other investors costs the fund nothing.52 We address some of the reasons why parties repeatedly negotiate for
such low-stakes bespoke rights below.
Who are the large investors that act as 1000-pound gorillas
demanding special contract rights? In practice, a range of investors negotiate side letters, each with their own investment objectives.53 According to a 2020 study by the law firm Seward & Kissel, the six principal investors negotiating side letters in private
capital are, in order of frequency: (1) funds-of-funds (42%); (2) government plans (18%); (3) corporate pension plans (15%); (4) endowments (10%); (5) wealthy individuals/family offices (7.5%);
and (6) non-profit institutions (7.5%).54 Alternatively, Professors
de Fontenay and Nili found that endowments and pension plans
negotiated over 60% of the side letters in their sample, followed
by foundations (14%).55 In Section III, we discuss foundations and
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) as common investors in
impact investing.56 Pushing these investors’ collective negotiation
power outside of the LPA and into the side letters stagnates LPA
best practice development. Strengthened LPA rights would benefit all investors, not just the parties to the side letters.
Common private equity side letter provisions include mostfavored nation clauses (MFNs), advisory committees, information
rights, separately managed accounts, and tax compliance.57 Controversial side letter provisions include management fee and carried interest discounts, which increase an investor’s potential return.58 Large investors also negotiate co-investment rights to

52 Funds reported a lack of trust in their non-DFI investors and “fear that information might leak into the public domain.” Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary,
supra note 47, at 4.
53 The SEC identified a range of potential side letter parties including “seed investors, strategic investors, those with large commitments, and employees, friends, and family.” Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note, 5 at 16,928.
54 SEWARD & KISSELL LLP, THE SEWARD & KISSEL 2019/2020 HEDGE FUND SIDE
LETTER STUDY 4 (2020), https://perma.cc/D3RU-Q7HP; see also Amy Whyte,
Funds-of-Funds Most Likely to Receive Preferential Hedge Fund Terms, INST. INV. (Sept.
15, 2017), https://perma.cc/HC22-DLKB.
55 de Fontenay and Nili, supra note 27, at 31–32. Foundations, corporate pension
plans, financial institutions, sovereign wealth funds, and family offices each accounted for
5% or less of the investors negotiating side letters. Id.
56 For a description of DFI investors, see infra note 77 and accompanying text.
57 Clayton, supra note 4, at 105–06.
58 Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Fee Structure and Blockchain Applications, in PRIVATE
FUND REPORT (Lowell Milken Inst. for Bus. L. & Pol’y, UCLA Sch. of L. ed., 2017) (“It has
become increasingly common in recent years for investors to negotiate fees with fund managers.”); see also Magnuson, supra note 6, at 1887 (“[I]nvestors can receive significantly
different returns, based on management-fee discounts and rebates.”); cf. de Fontenay and
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invest directly in portfolio companies alongside the fund, thus
granting the investor double access to the portfolio company and
a greater chance of returns.59 Collectively, these side letter terms
allow preferred investors to strengthen their claims to returns
and relative position in the fund.60
Recently, the SEC weighed in on the practice, issuing guidance on investor risks associated with hidden hierarchies in side
letters.61 Private fund investment advisors fail to make adequate
disclosures, and run afoul of the SEC, when they do not inform
fund investors after other investors negotiate preferential liquidity terms.62 The side letters in question fundamentally changed
the risk exposure to the other investors in the fund. Failure to
disclose these special terms meant that some investors were unaware of the potential harm that could be caused by select investors redeeming their investments ahead of other investors, particularly in times of market distortion where there is a greater
likelihood of a financial impact.63 In February 2022, the SEC went
one step further, proposing new rules for private funds

Nili, supra note 27, at 38–39 (finding low occurrence of fee discounts and financial terms
in their side letter study).
59 PREQIN, PREQIN SPECIAL REPORT: LP APPETITE FOR PRIVATE EQUITY COINVESTMENTS 3–4 (2012) (documenting the prevalence of co-investments in private equity
deals and the motivations for doing so such as lower investment fees and a chance for
higher returns); PREQIN, PREQIN SPECIAL REPORT: PRIVATE EQUITY CO-INVESTMENT
OUTLOOK 9 (2015) [hereinafter PREQIN, PRIVATE EQUITY CO-INVESTMENT OUTLOOK] (documenting LP appetite for co-investments citing “superior returns” as motivation); PREQIN:
PREQIN SPECIAL REPORT: PRIVATE EQUITY FUND MANAGER OUTLOOK 7 (2018) (citing return maximization as a main LP motivation and relationship building with investors and
“access to additional capital for deals” as the main motivations for managers); cf. de Fontenay and Nili, supra note 27, at 39 (finding only 6.3% of side letters contain co-investment
rights in their side letter study).
60 “[P]referential terms do not necessarily benefit the fund or other investors that
are not party to the side letter agreement and, at times, we believe these terms can have
a material, negative effect on other investors.” Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note
5, at 16,928.
61 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RISK ALERT: OBSERVATIONS FROM EXAMINATION OF
INVESTMENT ADVISORS MANAGING PRIVATE FUNDS 3 (June 23, 2020) [hereinafter U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RISK ALERT], https://perma.cc/SL63-8GA5; see also Philip A. Falcone and Harbinger Charged with Securities Fraud, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 27,
2012), https://perma.cc/8WPK-GLT9.
62 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RISK ALERT, supra note 61, at 3 (“[S]ome investors
were unaware of the potential harm that could be caused if the selected investors exercised
the special terms granted by the side letters.”).
63 Philip Falcone and Harbinger Capital Agree to Settlement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Aug. 19, 2013), https://perma.cc/77TP-6F39 (“Falcone and Harbinger granted favorable redemption and liquidity terms to certain large investors in HCP Fund I, and did
not disclose certain of these arrangements to the fund’s board of directors and the other
fund investors.”).
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prohibiting preferential liquidity, certain information rights, and
other side terms not disclosed to all investors.64
Further, negotiating and complying with patchwork and bespoke obligations introduces transaction costs for the fund.65
Agreeing to and documenting side letters costs time and money.
Complex terms with layers of carve-outs, developed across multiple documents, also increase compliance costs over the life of the
fund. Side letters with multiple investors increase administrative
costs to managers.66 Without limits on side letter provisions or a
checklist to monitor performance of all fund side letter agreements, managers can be swamped by compliance obligations.67
The combination of complexity and divergence presents general
partners (GPs) with a business risk in complying with the stipulations of one side-letter without falling afoul of another or of the
LPA itself.68
B. Impact Investing Side Letters
Impact investing shares much of the structure and dynamics
of private equity, but the addition of a non-pecuniary goal generates its own set of pressures as well. Fund managers and investors vary in their impact goals, mandates, and motivation.69 As a
result, the need to “write your own ticket” is especially salient in
impact investing, elevating the importance of side letters as a tool
to document idiosyncratic investment priorities.
Due to the limited literature on side letters, we introduce a
novel data set of 79 impact investment side letter agreements, as
well as a set of interviews with impact investing stakeholders.70
64 Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note 5, at 16,886 (proposing rules “that would
prohibit all private fund advisers, including those that are not registered with the Commission, from . . . providing preferential treatment to certain investors in a private fund,
unless the adviser discloses such treatment to other current and prospective investors”).
65 See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text; see also de Fontenay and Nili, supra
note 27, at 44–45 (outlining the negotiation costs and material delays of side letters).
66 Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 5; see also Proposed
Private Fund Rules, supra note 5, at 16,930 (citing to the compliance costs of side letters).
67 Joseph M. Mannon & Nell M. Blatherwick, Private Fund Side Letters–Investor
Agendas, Tactics and Disclosure, 19 INV. LAW. 1, 5 (2012); see also de Fontenay and Nili,
supra note 27, at 7–8 (describing the complexity of excessive modularity resulting from
multiple, simultaneous side letters).
68 ESG Cap. Partners II, LP v. Passport Special Opportunities Master Fund, LP,
No. CV 11053, 2015 WL 9060982, at *13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2015) (finding a side letter
violated the LPA); see also Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 3
(discussing side letter compliance concerns).
69 Geczy et al., supra note 24, at 710.
70 Section III, infra, contains more details on the data collection and the interview
process.
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The mixed methods approach provides a 360-degree view of side
letters, stakeholders, and the economic and political reality in
which these shadow contracts are negotiated.
For impact investment funds, the large investors demanding
special contract rights are typically foundations71 and development finance institutions (DFIs).72 Foundations count impact investments toward their program related investments (PRIs), defined under IRS rules as investments that further one or more of
the foundation’s exempt purposes.73 PRIs cannot be intended to
primarily produce income: making money can be a byproduct, but
not the primary purpose.74 PRIs are counted toward a private
foundation’s minimum distribution requirement of 5% per year,
but many foundations invest beyond the 5% benchmark.75 For example, one side letter includes the statement:
The parties also acknowledge that the Foundation is purchasing the Interest as a “program-related investment”
within the meaning of Section 4944(c) of the Code and are
entering into this Agreement in order to allow the Foundation to determine that its investment will be used to further

71 “Venture philanthropy (VP) is a funding model within the broader movement of
impact investing in which a nonprofit or ‘mission-driven’ organization makes investments
to advance its philanthropic mission.” Esther S. Kim & Andrew W. Lo, Venture Philanthropy: A Case Study of the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation 1 (2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://perma.cc/MNS9-CHQH.
72 National and International Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), as defined
by the OECD, “are specialized development banks or subsidiaries set up to support private
sector development in developing countries. They are usually majority-owned by national
governments and source their capital from national or international development funds or
benefit from government guarantees.” Development Finance Institutions and Private Sector Development, OECD, https://perma.cc/WKP8-QMSJ (last visited Feb. 9, 2022).
73 I.R.C. § 4944(c). “[A] private-foundation investment . . . will subject the foundation
to jeopardy taxes under § 4944 of the Internal Revenue Code unless the investment is a
PRI, and, even if so, the foundation must carefully monitor the investment to assure it is
used for the intended purpose. Failure to do so may subject even a PRI to a § 4945 excise
tax on taxable expenditures.” Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 252 (2010) (footnote omitted). Like DFIs, foundation PRIs were first conceived of in the 1960s. “The Ford Foundation created a $10 million program it called the ‘Program Related Investment Account’ in
1968, and first used it that year to make loans to businesses and other entities in undercapitalized communities.” Dana Brakman Reiser, Foundation Regulation in Our Age of
Impact, 17 PITT. TAX REV. 357, 364 (2020).
74 Program-Related Investments, IRS, https://perma.cc/WU6Y-FPBA (last visited
Feb. 10, 2022) (“A potentially high rate of return does not automatically prevent an investment from qualifying as program-related.”).
75 Impact Investing by Foundations: Key Terms in Philanthropy, MISSION INVS.
EXCH. (Aug. 2018), https://perma.cc/PY2A-NBAX.

2022]

Shadow Contracts

273

significantly the accomplishment of the Foundation’s charitable purposes.76
Like foundations, DFI investments are motivated by policy.77
DFIs are investors established and funded by governments to
achieve policy and social objectives through private investments.78 DFIs are “public” private equity vehicles. For example,
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the
World Bank Group, is the largest global DFI with $35 billion of
committed capital for FY 202179 contributing to a global impact
investment market estimated over $715 billion in 2020.80
DFIs and foundations provide important capital to impact investment funds for the same reason as any large investor in private market funds—they represent a large infusion of capital and
potential investments in subsequent ventures. DFIs and foundations hold additional bargaining power in impact investing funds
because they regularly accept concessionary (below-market) returns even in funds aiming for market-rate profits.81 Foundation
capital,82 sometimes called catalytic capital, may “anchor” a project by providing stable capital with lower expected returns.83 It

76

Side Letter Doc. 30 (on file with authors).
DFIs emerged in the 1960s and have been a major player in development finance
ever since. In 2017, for example, DFIs committed $87 billion in non-sovereign, private
sector development financing, down from peaks over $90 billion earlier in the decade.
DANIEL F. RUNDE & AARON MILNER, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD., DEVELOPMENT
FINANCE INSTITUTIONS: PLATEAUED GROWTH, INCREASING NEED 2 (2019).
78 Manuela Francisco et al., Measuring the Performance and Achievement of Social
Objectives of Development Finance Institutions 2 (World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 4506, 2008). DFIs (under one view in the source) were created under the belief
that “an expansion of financial services supports economic growth” therefore DFIs can
address prevailing market failures and reach underserved segments.” Id. at 6. DFIs
(again, this is the position of the social view of DFIs) were also created as an alternative
to pure for-profit banks with low or no interest in serving low-income individuals, remote
communities, or investing in “unprofitable projects with positive social externalities.” Id.
79 About IFC, INT’L FIN. CORP., https://perma.cc/4CHB-RBBS (last visited Feb. 10,
2022).
80 GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTMENT NETWORK (GIIN), 2020 ANNUAL IMPACT INVESTOR
SURVEY 40 (June 2020), https://perma.cc/53DD-Y63C.
81 Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 4–5. For examples of
such funds, see Financial Intermediary Funds (FTFs), WORLD BANK,
https://perma.cc/RXA7-4D6Z (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
82 U.S. foundations make grants of $60 billion and hold assets totaling $865 billion.
ROCKEFELLER PHILANTHROPY ADVISORS, IMPACT INVESTING: AN INTRODUCTION 1,
https://perma.cc/7YMU-7YDY (last visited Apr. 20, 2022). Only a portion of this, however,
is in impact investing. “During the past two decades, less than one percent of U.S. foundations made PRIs each year.” Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social
Goals, 106 VA. L. REV. 937, 959 (2020).
83 Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 4 (describing DFI
capital as “cornerstone” and too attractive to forego).
77
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can also give an unproven fund region or impact focus the capital
necessary to build financial capacity and proof points, which will
then allow the fund to attract non-foundation capital.84 Similarly,
interviewees report that DFIs also attract other governmentbacked investors by providing cornerstone capital, a practice referred to as “club investing”.85 DFI capital provides a strong
branding advantage for wider fund-raising among individual investors more willing to invest after a DFI-stamp of approval, and
for later fund raising in subsequent funds.86
Fund managers, whether dealing with traditional large investors, foundations, or DFIs, will negotiate special terms for important investors.87 Manager concessions are not always obsequious, but are often driven by foundation and DFI organizational
needs. Foundations require unique information to confirm the
charitable purpose of the investment and document that the investment satisfies IRS regulations.88 For example, the foundation
side letter excerpt below specifically addresses GP obligations to
serve the charitable purpose, prevent mission drift, report on any
changes, and provide extensive information to the foundation annually.
The General Partner shall use all reasonable efforts to measure the extent to which the MFI’s are [serving the charitable
mission] and shall take all customary and reasonable steps
that are practicable under the circumstances to monitor its
Investments for compliance with its charitable purpose and
to prevent Mission Drift . . . .

84 Debra Schwartz, Catalytic Capital: An Essential Foundation Tool, MISSION INVS.
EXCH. (Nov. 2017), https://perma.cc/8TJ2-N2CT (commenting on the author’s role and experience leading impact investments at The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation).
85 “[S]ecuring one DFI is likely to result in a number of them participating, while
losing one would often mean losing them all.” Qualitative Interview Session 1, supra note
47, at 4–5.
86 “Even where they [DFIs] are a less important component of the LP base, it was
noticed that unlike private investors their willingness to invest in follow up funds in the
face of disappointing performance by earlier funds make them a crucial contributor to the
long-term financial viability of fund managers.” Id.
87 Clayton, supra note 4, at 89–90. “Side letters . . . grant more favorable rights and
privileges to certain preferred investors . . . [a]dvisers often provide these terms for strategic reasons that benefit the adviser.” Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note 5, at
16,928.
88 David Wood, Roles Foundations Play in Shaping Impact Investing, STAN. SOC.
INNOV. REV. (July 13, 2000) (describing the Rockefeller Foundation’s impact reporting requirements), https://perma.cc/SXZ6-5EL3.
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Notice . . . [a]ny change in circumstances that would cause
the Interest no longer to serve the [charitable] purposes
stated in Section [X] of the Partnership Agreement . . .
Reporting . . . [i]n addition to financial reports to Limited
Partners required under the Partnership Agreement, the
Fund shall submit to the Foundation at least once a year . . .
a statement signed by an authorized officer of the General
Partner certifying that the Fund and the General Partner are
in compliance with the terms of this Agreement.
The General Partner shall provide the Foundation access to
all information the Foundation deems relevant to evaluating
the Fund’s activities, including any and all reports produced
by the General Partner, the Investment Committee, or the
Investor Advisory Committee pertaining to the performance
of the Fund.89
DFIs, as quasi-governmental actors, also have unique reporting mandates from sponsoring governments and oversight obligations including rigorous financial accounting.90 DFIs also often require documentation that their investment dollars are serving
stated policy objectives and are not being used for prohibited activities such as child labor, nuclear weapons, or money laundering.91 One DFI side letter states: “If the General Partner has
knowledge . . . that a potential investment in a Portfolio Company
is a Prohibited Investment . . . the General Partner will so notify
the Investor and . . . a description of the activities that it reasonably believes render such an investment a Prohibited Investment . . . .”92 Prohibited investments are also defined in this side
letter covering a range of military and civilian weapons.93 Where
89

Side Letter Doc. 30 (on file with authors).
“The transparency policies adopted by impact investors and DFIs to comply with
their own monitoring, reporting and public disclosure framework in contrast compel them
to require the ability to harvest and, in some cases, disclose information.” Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 2.
91 “[P]references and circumstances idiosyncratic to each DFI do play a role. While
some DFIs have a specific focus on business integrity, others will be more concerned about
money laundering issues, resulting in clauses of diverging length and complexity to be
added to the side-letter.” Id. at 3.
92 Side Letter Doc. 22 (on file with authors).
93 Prohibited investments include:
90

(a) Manufacturing, selling or using cluster munitions whole systems or components, (b) manufacturing, selling or using landmines whole systems or components, or (c) deriving, in their most recent fiscal year, more than 10% of their
revenue from (i) the manufacture or sale of firearms and small arms
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each DFI has its own unique set of reporting mandates and prohibited activities, side letters are negotiated and agreed to for
each, to accommodate the investor’s need.94
In our empirical analysis in Section III, we show that side
letters share common themes. For example, they frequently address information rights, advisory committees, MFNs, and compliance, among other topics. But side letters are neither uniform
nor simplistic (see e.g., Figure 6). Our document analysis reveals
a wide range in the length, content, and complexity of side letters.95 We make recommendations in Section IV to better address
investors’ needs.
C. Costs of Side Letters
Side letters extract real dollars from impact investment deals
through increased transaction costs and complexity. Negotiating
and tailoring terms in side letters increases the transactional
costs of impact deals. Side letters, reported to once be twenty-page
documents, now loom as large as forty-five pages according to one
interviewee.96 Side letters in our sample extend to seventy-nine
pages, although the majority are under ten pages.97 One interviewee reported legal costs of $1.5 million incurred by a single
fund, the bulk of which corresponded to side letter negotiation
with multiple DFIs.98 The standard legal cost of side letters is
more routinely estimated at $10–15,000 per impact investor,
which again suggests significant idiosyncrasies.99 Where impact
investors, specifically DFIs, provide the bulk of the capital, they
bear the full cost of negotiation as the GPs’ costs are charged to
ammunitions for civilian markets, (ii) the production or sale of conventional
weapons and related systems or components, (iii) the production of chemical
and/or biological weapons and related systems or components, (iv) the production of nuclear weapons and related systems or components or (v) the production
of depleted uranium weapons, ammunitions and armor . . . .
Id.
94

Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 3.
See infra Section III.B.3.a. We see no evidence of boilerplate language; instead,
each document has its own idiosyncrasies. See also Mannon & Blatherwick, supra note 67,
at 7.
96 Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 3; de Fontenay and
Nili, supra note 27, at 32–33 (finding increases in side letter lengths and provision numbers that can bloat side letters to 40 pages in length).
97 See Compiled Side Letter Data File (on file with authors).
98 “[A] Fund recently [spent] $1.5 million on legal costs, the bulk of which corresponded to side letters negotiation with multiple DFIs vividly illustrated the magnitude
of the problem.” Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 5.
99 “[T]the standard legal cost to the GP of side-letters was identified as at least $10–
15,000 per DFI.” Id.
95
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the fund and, therefore, the investor.100 Side letter negotiations
also extract opportunity costs, with negotiations lasting between
twelve to eighteen months creating a material delay.101
Once a targeted intervention, side letters have become a
source of contention in impact investing.102 Three factors drive the
current situation. First, contract templates used by legal firms
contain default terms like confidentiality provisions developed for
non-impact deals (i.e., deals without public and policy objectives)
that are a poor fit for the impact objectives and blend of private/public objectives.103 Second, and perhaps more pervasive, embedded norms around confidentiality and proprietary investment
pipelines in private market finance104 have been imported into the
impact space, even when they are not well-adapted to the needs
of impact.105 Sophisticated deals tend to have such protections, so
the absence is unfamiliar, if not uncomfortable. These norms are
“sticky” where lawyers for funds and investors have incentives to
protect proprietary forms and charge billable hours for repetitive
customization.106 Professors de Fontenay and Nili also describe a
perceived slippery slope where funds and lawyers are over-protective of LPA terms, believing any deviation lowers the negotiation bar for all future fund negotiations, whereas side letters offer
less visible and less permanent modifications.107 Third, side
100 “[I]n the private equity world, the GPs are only temporarily and nominally bearing
the legal costs of the negotiation as these are eventually charged to the fund, and therefore
to the investors. Particularly where they provide the bulk of the capital, DFIs ironically
therefore bear the cost of both sides of the negotiation.” Id.
101 Id.
102 “There is full consensus around the fact that side letters constitute the main obstacle to simplification and standardization of the legal documentation framework.” Id. at
3; see also Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note 5, at 16,952 (proposed that required
disclosures would discourage funds from “providing certain preferential terms in the interest of avoiding future negotiations with other investors”).
103 “A secondary driver of the prevalence of confidentiality clauses is associated with
the various templates used by legal firms, which tend to contain confidentiality clauses
regardless of the need or desire for one on the part of their clients.” Qualitative Interview
Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 2.
104 Limited partnership agreements often include confidentiality provisions with
sweeping restrictions on the disclosure to third parties of a wide array of information that
is considered confidential, including partnership terms, the identity of other limited partners, and side arrangements with the general partner. These types of provisions prevent
limited partners from discussing business matters with other limited partners, effectively
prohibiting the investors from cooperating. Magnuson, supra note 6, at 1883 (footnote
omitted).
105 “GPs consider information on portfolio companies to represent their competitive
advantage, in the absence of an investment process they can point at for differentiation
purposes.” Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 2.
106 Id. at 2, 5 (discussing the role of legal forms and the billables earned by lawyers).
107 de Fontenay & Nili, supra note 27, at 47–48.
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letters are perceived as easy-to-implement solutions, particularly
for DFIs and foundations adjusting to changed policy goals and
program requirements.108 Side letters may seem like an efficient
vehicle to resolve bespoke information and oversight needs, but
they can present concealed costs in negotiation, implementation,
and oversight. These three factors create preferences and path
dependencies for suboptimal LPA terms that require remediation
in a side letter.
III. IMPACT INVESTING: A CASE STUDY
The scant private markets literature notes the following common side letter provisions: management fee discounts,109 co-investments,110 confidentiality and information rights,111 MFNs,112
and advisory board seats. How often do we see these provisions,
and others, in impact investment side letters? This case study
adds to the literature by documenting side letter practices in impact investing. It also illustrates the Easterbrook and Fischel theory of tailoring contracts to reflect parties’ preferences for risk,
return, and here, impact. Our empirical analysis provides a basis
for our later discussion of side letters’ costs and benefits.
A. Data & Methodology
We present contract coding data on seventy-nine side letter
agreements with impact investment funds. These documents
were collected as part of the Impact Finance Database (IFD), an
initiative of the Impact Finance Research Consortium (IFRC).113
108 “When a DFI’s government, or its governance structure, issues a new policy that
affects DFI fund investments, the path of least resistance is for the legal team to write
these directly into the side-letter, in the full confidence that GPs are very unlikely to push
back given their need (or greed) for DFI capital.” Qualitative Interview Session 2, Summary 3 (Feb. 5, 2021) (on file with authors).
109 In the 2019–2020 study, fee discounts were the most prominent side letter provision appearing in 46% of all side letters reviewed. SEWARD & KISSELL LLP, supra note 54,
at 3.
110 “‘Со-investing’ describes arrangements where a manager invites large investors
to invest alongside the pooled fund in portfolio companies the pooled fund is investing in.”
Clayton, supra note 4, at 104. Co-investments are attractive to large investors because
they routinely outperform other investment opportunities on a net-of-fees basis due to reduced fees charged on co-investments. Id.
111 Mannon & Blatherwick, supra note 67, at 2.
112 SEWARD & KISSELL LLP, supra note 54, at 3.
113 IMPACT FIN. RSCH. CONSORTIUM, supra note 26 (“The Impact Finance Research
Consortium (IFRC) is a collaboration among the Wharton School, Harvard Business
School, and the University of Chicago Booth School of Business to advance academic research on impact investing.”). We obtained documents used in this case study in partnership with Eighteen East Capital, https://perma.cc/A88C-D4GR (last visited Feb. 20, 2022),
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In 2019–2021, we studied side letters as a part of a private
grant. Research partners on the grant approached major DFIs,
multilateral development banks (MDBs), funds of funds, and
foundations to request access to contracting documents pertaining to their private equity fund investments. European Development Finance Institutions (an association of European DFIs) provided further assistance in reaching out to individual DFIs. All
documents collected in the project are subject to strict confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements.
To analyze the contents of the contracts, we developed a contract coding process using contract variables and coding procedures drawn from the legal and finance literatures.114 Questions
about confidentiality were developed in conjunction with grant
partners and after a review of confidentiality provisions in the
existing database. We hired, trained, and supervised law students to record the presence or absence of terms, record variations
within provisions, and quote relevant language from the contracts. Text responses verify coding entries, control for accuracy,
and extract additional information on observable trends and nuances in contract provisions.
Our sample of seventy-nine impact fund side letters spans
from 1993 to 2019, with a majority of agreements entered into
after 2010 (see Figure 1). The sample represents forty-five funds
formed across the globe with clear concentration in North America and Africa (see Figure 2).

through a 2020 grant funded by Swedish International Development Association (SIDA),
https://perma.cc/GUK4298F (last visited Feb. 20, 2022), and FinDev Canada,
https://perma.cc/ACG7-QXL8 (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
Beginning in 2015, we helped to create a database of impact investing fund contracts, first
under WSII and more recently as part of the Impact Finance Database (IFD). The IFD
data were originally collected by WSII’s two-pronged data collection efforts: a survey about
the impact investment practices, and collection of documents (legal and financial). WSII
created a list of funds via primary research because there was no working directory of
funds, and in partnership with organizations such as B Lab, the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA), and Anthos Asset Management, and by referring to
lists such as ImpactBase and Impact Assets 50. Since the data collection project began in
2015, nearly 500 fund managers have been contacted resulting in a database that represents over 100 separate funds and 1300 portfolio companies.
114 Geczy et al., supra note 24, at 699.
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Figure 3: Geographic investment focus

Drawing in additional data available through Preqin,115 we
report additional data on matched funds including geographic focus (Figure 3) and industry focus (Figure 4). Funds don’t always
form where they invest, and Figure 3 shows a more widespread
distribution of geographic focal areas. Figure 4 shows a variety of
investment industries for impact funds with consumer products
being the most common and a cluster of funds in raw materials,
financials, manufacturing, health care, industrials, and diversified assets.116

115 Preqin is an investment data company providing descriptive and financial information on private market investments. Of the 45 unique impact funds in our data sample,
we were able to find 37 funds also covered in the Preqin database. We obtained data on
geographic focus for 36 funds and on industry focus for 35 funds. More information on
Preqin data is available at Our Data, PREQIN, https://perma.cc/T7CJ-9UGD (last visited
Apr. 13, 2022).
116 In Figures 3 and 4, the y axis captures the percent of fund documents belonging to
a fund with the given geographic or industry focus. Funds can have multiple industry foci,
so the bars in Figure 4 sum to more than 100%.
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Figure 4: Industry focus

In addition to the direct document analysis, qualitative interview sessions were conceived to document and explain the dynamics contributing to the complexity and divergence we observed in the documents. As part of the grant, we focused in
particular on the prevalence and strength of confidentiality
clauses.
We conducted qualitative interviews on November 6, 2020,
and February 5, 2021.117 Both sessions were conducted under
Chatham House rules. Specific inputs are not ascribed to specific
individuals or specific institutions. Interview participants were
selected by grant partners because of their specific area of expertise and their familiarity with the project, and willingness to participate in at least two workshop sessions. Interviewees represented key stakeholders in the investment process: four LPs, one
GP, and two representatives from a major US law firm representing GPs.

117 Citations are made to interview notes on file with authors. In the first session,
participants were presented with the early findings of side letters and asked to describe
what they know to be the sources of and the reasons for the observed patterns. In the
second session, the group discussed side letters further as well as legal documentation
simplification and standardization.
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Combining quantitative document analysis with qualitative
interview insights affords us a more complete and nuanced view
of the role played by side letters in impact investing. We organize
the presentation of our analysis below primarily around our
quantitative results, weaving in insights from the interviews as
appropriate. We then discuss the broader implications of these
empirical patterns in Section IV.
B. Common Impact Investing Side Letter Provisions
Side letters vary widely, each negotiating a bespoke resolution tailored to the idiosyncratic and infinitely variable needs of
different funds and investors. Parties are effectively writing their
own corporate tickets. Figure 5 provides an overview of the main
provisions in our sample.
Provisions can be grouped into several buckets. In the sections below, we distinguish between provisions pertaining to investor return protections, impact protections and compliance, and
governance.

Figure 5: Frequency of common side letter provisions

1. Investor Return Protections
Contract terms establishing parties’ rights, priorities, and future opportunities help investors ensure a return on the capital
invested into the fund. These contract terms do not set the price
of the contract, like the minimum investment or the hurdle rate,
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but they frame an investor’s opportunity or likelihood to make
money on the initial investment. Examples of investor return protections in our side letters include MFNs, co-investment rights,
and management fee waivers.
In our sample, 58% of side letters contain MFNs.118 MFNs
protect the holder of the right against another investor getting
better individualized rights.119 For large investors that don’t see
themselves as equal, but as uniquely valuable, this is especially
crucial.120 One side letter in our sample presents the MFN in the
following way:
Should any such side letter . . . have the effect of establishing
rights or otherwise benefiting such Limited Partner in a
manner more favorable in any respect to such Limited Partner than the rights and benefits established in favor of Investor by the Partnership Agreement and this letter agreement,
the Investor shall automatically and without any need for
any further action, receive all such rights and benefits unless
and until it shall have given notice to the contrary to the General Partner.121
Other MFN variations require the fund to disclose to the investor, at the time of investment, any outstanding side letters and
thereafter to provide notice of any subsequent side letters.
The General Partner has disclosed to the Investor all side letters or similar agreements (“Side Letters”) entered into by it
on or prior to the date hereof with any of the Limited Partners. At any time after the date hereof should any Limited
Partner receive any side letter or similar agreement from the
General Partner, the Investor will be given a copy of such
agreement within 30 days after the Closing Date . . . .122

118 Compare to the 44% observed in private market side letters. SEWARD & KISSELL
LLP, supra note 54, at 3. Further, Professors de Fontenay and Nili found MFN provisions
to be the most common provisions in their sample, but it fluctuated over time—starting
under 30% in 2005, rising to nearly 90% in the financial crisis, and dropping to around
60% since 2014. de Fontenay and Nili, supra note 27, at 34.
119 Clayton, supra note 4, at 94.
120 “LP1 further remarked that DFIs do not see themselves as equal investors, and
that they ‘feel’ they should command better terms . . . . [E]ven if all the side letters information rights they require could be transferred to the LPA, [investors] would still insist
on a side letter. Particularly important to them is the ‘most favored nation’ (‘MFN’) clause
that ensures they indeed cannot have more limited rights than other LPs.” Qualitative
Interview Session 2 Summary, supra note 108, at 2.
121 Side Letter Doc. 31 (on file with authors).
122 Side Letter Doc. 10 (on file with authors).
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MFNs ensure relative bargaining positions between investors. However, MFN rights, in traditional private market deals,
apply only to investors who have made investments of equal or
lesser value—so those rights do not protect investors against the
bargaining power of even larger investors.123 We see such conditional MFNs in our sample, but less frequently.124
Interviewees explored one explanation for the variation in
MFN rights: conflicts between multi-lateral and bi-lateral DFIs.
Multi-lateral DFIs, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and European Investment Bank, are private sector
arms of international finance institutions with multiple private
and government-backed investors.125 Multi-lateral DFIs are more
demanding than their bi-lateral counterparts, and bi-lateral DFIs
would ask for whatever is granted to the multi-lateral “over and
beyond what they would normally require.”126
Several MFNs carve out exceptions such as for charitable
foundation requirements127 or fees, 128 as well as clarifications
about what is included in the MFN (e.g., “This [MFN] provision
applies equally to Alternative Investment Vehicle.”).129
Co-investment terms appear in 41% of impact side letters reviewed. Co-investment provisions in our sample include language
such as: “[Fund] will provide opportunities to co-invest in Portfolio Companies [and the] Investor shall be offered the opportunity
to participate in any co-investment on terms no less favorable
than those offered to any other potential co-investors.”130 On the
substance, there is little difference between the purpose of co-investment terms in impact or private market deals—both seek to

123 Kevin Vance, Hedge Fund Side Letters: Conflicts of Interest and Best Practices, 26
J. TAX’N & REGUL. FIN. INST. 23, 24 (2013). In our sample, we observe some, but infrequent
language restricting MFN clauses to the highest investors. The MFN “right shall not apply
to any Additional Right which is (i) provided only to investors having a Commitment to
the Partnership that exceeds that of the Investor in aggregate.” Side Letter Doc. 22 (on
file with authors).
124 Compiled Side Letter Data File (on file with authors).
125 See, e.g., About IFC, supra note 79.
126 Qualitative Interview Session 2 Summary, supra note 108, at 3.
127 “Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, unless separately agreed to by the General Partner and the Investor, any rights provided to accommodate specific regulatory,
organizational or structural requirements of a particular investor (e.g., to address investment requirements of a charitable foundation) shall not apply to the Investor.” Side Letter
Doc. 33 (on file with authors).
128 “[T]his Section . . . shall not apply to any reduction in the Management Fees and
Carried Distributions payable . . . .” Side Letter Doc. 46 (on file with authors).
129 “This [MFN] provision applies equally to Alternative Investment Vehicle.” Side
Letter Doc. 50 (on file with authors).
130 Side Letter Doc. 45 (on file with authors).
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help an investor earn a higher return and serve as a weak price
adjustment. But our findings are harder to interpret on the frequency: some private market reviews find high rates of co-investment, and others find much lower frequency (< 10%).131
Management fee terms, often negotiating a discount, amending reporting obligations, or clarifying carve outs, occur in 23% of
our sample.132 Again, the substance of the provisions is the same
in both impact and private market contexts, but the frequency
may vary between the two. One law firm study found that discounted management fee provisions occur more frequently in traditional private market deals (46%) and are on the rise starting
in 2018.133 Recent academic work, however, found that true fee
discounts rarely occur, although the study also found a recent increase in financial-related terms overall.134 Poor performance cycles like the one caused by the onset of the global pandemic in
2020 may prompt more attention to financial terms as managers
and investors alike try to massage returns in down cycles.135
Other examples of impact side letter provisions protecting investors’ returns include investor withdrawal rights,136 termination rights,137 and fee clawback provisions.138

131

SEWARD & KISSELL LLP, supra note 54, at 3; de Fontenay & Nili, supra note 27,

at 39.
132 For example. one side letter contained covenants to disclose separate management
fee arrangements, similar to an MFN. Side Letter Doc. 37 (on file with authors) (“The
General Partner hereby covenants and agrees to disclose to the Investor if and to the extent it enters into a separate agreement to reduce the Management Fee calculated with
respect to any Limited Partner.”). Another side letter defined management fee obligations
after a default by an investor. Side Letter Doc. 54 (on file with authors).
133 SEWARD & KISSELL LLP, supra note 54, at 3.
134 de Fontenay & Nili, supra note 27, at 6, 38.
135 SEWARD & KISSELL LLP, supra note 54, at 3.
136 “[I]n the event that the Fund or the General Partner violate or fail to carry out
any provision of this Agreement, the Foundation may withdraw from the Fund . . . .” Side
Letter Doc. 30 (on file with authors).
137 “[T]he Investor shall be permitted to cease making payments to the Fund if:
(a) any Fund Party has materially or repeatedly breached any of the Fund Documents; (b)
there is (x) a material or repeated failure by any Fund Party or any Investee Company to
comply with (i) the Investment Code, (ii) any agreed E&S Action Plan or (iii) the E&S
Requirements and the relevant Investee Company has failed to implement any agreed
Remediation Measures to the Investor’s satisfaction (acting reasonably and in good faith)
or (iv) a breach of applicable anti-money laundering laws and regulations; (c) an event of
bankruptcy, insolvency, dissolution, liquidation (including provisional liquidation), safeguard or any similar proceedings under applicable laws, of XX, the General Partner, the
Investment Advisor, the Carried Interest Partner arises; and/or (d) any of the circumstances set out in . . . in the LPA arises.” Side Letter Doc. 78 (on file with authors).
138 “[The fund] agree[s] to provide you with details of the amount of any clawback
obligation and any amounts accrued in the Escrow Account pursuant to . . . the Constitution . . . .” Side Letter Doc. 54 (on file with authors).
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2. Impact Protections & Compliance
Impact side letters frequently clarify expectations, add restrictions, or impose additional obligations on funds to pursue and
stay faithful to a particular impact ethos.139 Here, we discuss provisions related directly to impact or compliance with impact-adjacent regulations, like anti-money laundering or program-related investments.140 Forty-two percent of side letters contained
additional ESG or impact obligations. Impact terms include new
commitments to collect and report impact-specific data,141 adding
new social impact objectives,142 and listing prohibited investment
activities antithetical to the investor’s impact ethos.143
Side letters also address the special tax or legal compliance
needs of impact investors. Investors negotiate for compliance provisions focused on Anti-money Laundering/Know Your Client obligations in over 54% of our sample side letters. In 49% of side
letters, funds also agree to notify investors of tax consequences
triggered by investments or ones that would threaten the private
foundation tax status of investors.144
Provisions excusing investors from some investments that
would violate the mandates of missions of investors,145 detailing

139

See Program-Related Investments, supra note 74.
See, e.g., Parliament and Council Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) 43. Program-related investments (or PRIs) are defined by U.S. federal tax law as charitable foundation investments with a “primary purpose” of accomplishing one more charitable purposes, but not primarily to produce income. I.R.C. § 4944(c). See also Treas. Reg.
§ 53.4944–3(a)(iii).
141 For example, one fund agreed to collect and report information on renewable energy generated, CO2 offset, and CO2 captured by fund operations. Side Letter Doc. 15 (on
file with authors).
142 For example, one side letter added a focus on gender effects and capital market
development to a fund’s investment objectives. Side Letter Doc. 35 (on file with authors).
143 Impact investors frequently require confirmation that a fund is not engaging in
certain, prohibited behavior. See, e.g., supra notes 91–94.
144 See, e.g., “The GP shall transmit to the XX fund, within 90 days after the close of
each fiscal year, an annual narrative report (i) evidencing compliance with the charitable
purposes and covenants set forth in the partnership agreement and here in and with the
employment and training agreement set forth an attachment C to the investment policies,
which is attached as exhibit A to the partnership agreement, (ii) naming each portfolio
company and the size and type have investment in each portfolio company . . . .” Side Letter Doc. 75 (on file with authors).
140

145

Solely because of the Investor’s status as a development finance institution, we
hereby agree that the Investor shall not participate, and shall be treated as an
Excused Partner . . . in respect of any proposed Investment that would cause, or
reasonably be expected by the Investor to cause, harm to the Investor’s reputation and/or publicity that is unwanted by, or unfavourable to, the Investor . . . .
Side Letter Doc. 78 (on file with authors).
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investment policies,146 and restricting certain investments are additional,147 but less frequent, terms in impact side letters.
3. Participatory Governance
In our prior work we noted that participatory governance148
provisions appear to play a heightened role in impact investment
agreements under the theory that oversight encourages fidelity
to both profit and impact.149 Examples of participatory governance
include investment approval, guaranteed seats on advisory committees, information and reporting rights, access and inspection
rights, auditing rights, and access to Portfolio Companies.150 Of
these participatory governance approaches, we highlight the
three most prevalent in our sample: advisory committees (67%),
information rights (75%), and confidential provisions and carve
outs (47%).
a) Advisory Committees
Both traditional private market and impact investment
funds negotiate advisory committee rights with large investors
within side letters (see Figure 6).151 LP (investor) representatives
serve on advisory boards providing both oversight of and assistance to managers.152

146 In the section titled “Investment Policy”, one side letter provides the following “[t]
he General Partner hereby agrees that the Investor shall be permitted to cease making
Capital Contributions in the event the Fund has made Portfolio Investments in material
violation of the provisions set forth in the Investment Guidelines . . . .” Side Letter Doc. 38
(on file with authors).
147

The Company shall not enter into a transaction, and [the Manager] shall not
approve or enter into any transaction on behalf of the Company, that would
cause the Investor to contravene the . . . Act (as amended from time to time) or
any other governmental or regulatory investment restrictions with which the
Investor is required to comply pursuant to 1.1 above (together the “Investment
Restrictions”).
Side Letter Doc. 34 (on file with authors).
148 See Geczy et al., supra note 24, at 707–08.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 704.
151 For a discussion of private market advisory committee discussions, see Clayton,
supra note 4, at 105. See also Mannon & Blatherwick, supra note 67, at 2. Professors de
Fontenay and Nili found that 15–35% of private market side letters addressed governance
generally, including advisory committees. de Fontenay & Nili, supra note 27, at 38.
152 See Geczy et al., supra note 24, at 708–09.
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Figure 6: Advisory committee terms in side letters

Bargaining for advisory committee rights increases individual investors’ access to a fund manager, giving them a say in fund
operations to some degree, and even the power to vote on material
fund decisions.153 This is consistent with the language we see in
our sample.154 Within advisory committee provisions, the majority
(representing 57% of all side letters) guarantee the investor a voting seat on the committee.155
Provisions like the following are common: “[T]he Investor is
entitled to appoint a representative (the “Representative”) to attend meetings of and serve as a voting member of [advisory committee] . . . . Such Representative will not be removed or replaced
unless directed or consented to by the Investor in writing.”156
Investors with guaranteed seats on advisory boards can vote
unconstrained by fiduciary duty—investors can freely promote
their self-interest when voting.157 This concern may be lessened in
the impact arena where DFIs accept concessionary returns (less
incentive for selfish maneuvering) and often invest in collaboration with other DFIs, thus reducing the risk of selfish voting. The
common policy objectives of DFIs and other large impact investors

153

Clayton, supra note 4, at 105.
See also Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 3.
155 “Whilst you remain an investor in the Company and are not in default, you shall
be entitled to appoint a single representative (a ‘Representative’) to be a member of the
Advisory Board.” Side Letter Doc. 4 (on file with authors).
156 Side Letter Doc. 45 (on file with authors).
157 Clayton, supra note 6, at 105. In our review, we observed several provisions specifically disclaiming any fiduciary duty owed by members of the advisory committee.
154
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may make advisory committee access (if not advisory voting
rights) an effective oversight tool.
Even though the side letter provisions coalesce around advisory committee and voting rights, variation persists in how funds
address side letter provisions. For example, the length of the advisory clause among side letters with advisory committee rights
ranges from 15 to 363 words, with a median of 111 words.158 Side
letters use bespoke language to address common themes, a form
of rote customization, that illustrates both the lack of standardization and the increase in transaction costs when many investors
get special treatment.
Beyond guaranteeing investors’ voting rights, advisory committee provisions define or expand the committee’s role. Figure 7
enumerates the different advisory committee roles outlined in the
agreements. Note the relative low frequency overall. The most

158

Compare the advisory committee clause cited in supra note 156 with the following

text:
In consideration of the Investor’s subscription for a Commitment equal to 20%
of the Combined Commitments (up to a maximum Commitment of $5 million),
the General Partner covenants and agrees that, so long as the Investor or one of
its Affiliates remains a Limited Partner having a Commitment of at least $3
million, the Investor shall be entitled to (a) have an employee or other representative designated by the Investor (an “Investor Representative”) serve on the
Advisory Committee as a voting member and (b) remove and replace such Investor Representative from time to time in its sole discretion. If at any time (i) the
Investor is entitled to have an Investor Representative serve as a member of the
Advisory Committee and (ii) no Investor Representative is serving in such capacity, then until such time as the resulting vacancy on the Advisory Committee
is filled with an Investor Representative (or the Investor ceases to be entitled to
have an Investor Representative serve on the Advisory Committee), the General
Partner shall provide the Investor with copies of all written materials furnished
to voting members of the Advisory Committee and allow an employee of the Investor to participate as an observer at all meetings of the Advisory Committee.
The General Partner agrees that so long as the Investor is entitled to have an
Investor Representative serve on the Advisory Committee, the General Partner
shall use commercially reasonable efforts to cause the Partnership to maintain
liability insurance covering the individual members of the Advisory Committee
and shall provide evidence of such insurance to the Investor upon request.
(Sub-Committee) Investment Committee. In consideration of the Investor’s subscription for a Commitment equal to 20% of the Combined Commitments (up to
a maximum Commitment of $5 million), so long as the Investor or one of its
Affiliates remains a Limited Partner having a Commitment of at least $3 million, the Investor shall be entitled to have an Investor Representative observe
all meetings of the Investment Committee and to receive all written materials
produced specifically for use by the Investment Committee; provided, however,
that the Investment Committee shall not be required to schedule meetings to
accommodate such Investor Representative’s ability to participate.
Side Letter Doc. 46 (on file with authors).

2022]

Shadow Contracts

291

common advisory committee roles include investment strategy
and impact policy oversight, as well as approving investments,
conflicts of interests, and annual reports. For example, one DFI
side letter guaranteed the following:
2. The General Partner, on behalf of the Fund, will submit
the Fund’s E&S Management System (“ESMS”) for approval
to its Advisory Committee prior to its first investment;
3. The General Partner, on behalf of the Fund, will advise
and consult with the Advisory Committee regarding any proposed change in the objectives or operations of the Fund, including any material environmental or social risk posed by
the proposed change; and if requested by the Advisory Committee, amend the ESMS to assess and manage such additional risks in compliance with the E&S Requirements and
these provisions, in a manner reasonably acceptable to the
Advisory Committee.159
Provisions in the “other” category addressed the role of the committee if the fund or managers become involved in litigation/arbitration, or if a portfolio company materially defaults or needs remediation.

159

Side Letter Doc. 41 (on file with authors).
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Figure 7: Advisory committee roles

Taken as a whole, advisory committee provisions in impact
investment side letters reallocate power to limited partners.
Guaranteeing a seat on an advisory committee that oversees investments, reporting, and compliance serves as an important
check on manager discretion. Even in the niche world of impact
investment funds, the advisory committee side letter provisions
illustrate the lack of boilerplate and a high degree of tailoring.
Investor demand for advisory committees shows that in some
cases, tailored, ex ante contract rights are not enough. Some investors demand the ability to engage in oversight (and potentially
renegotiate) on an ongoing basis over the fixed investment life of
the fund.160 Like with private equity funds, impact LPs are locked
into the investment for roughly 10 years, but unlike in private
160

Clayton, supra note 4, at 76.
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equity, impact managers balance dual goals.161 Consider this side
letter provision providing information to the investor and a voice
two years into the fund’s active investment cycle:
Two (2) years after the Final Closing Date we shall appoint
an external ESG consultant to assess the Fund’s ESG performance against the ESGMS. We shall agree the terms of reference for such appointment with the LP Advisory Committee prior to such appointment. We shall consider and discuss
with the LP Advisory Committee the analysis provided by the
consultant and shall use commercially reasonable efforts to
implement any reasonable recommendations made by such
consultant which would be in the interest of the Fund.162
Participatory governance is an extension of the Easterbrook and
Fischel notion that parties can reduce essential performance and
governance terms ex ante at the time of contracting.163 In other
words, parties are writing terms specific to their preferences and
deal needs. With participatory governance rights in impact funds,
the parties are creating a contract mechanism to monitor future
performance and ensure the spirit of the contract (both profit and
purpose) is fulfilled continuously over the life of the venture.164
b) Confidentiality and information rights
Confidentiality is an important deal term in many settings,
but it appears to have outsize importance in impact investment
agreements. Consider the 2019/2020 private market fund study
that identified manager reporting obligations as a common side
letter provision and subsequent academic work finding more than
half of all side letters address information or confidentiality
rights.165 Compare this with the 75% of impact investment side
letters with information and report rights provisions (Figure 5).
An additional 47% of side letters also address confidentiality obligations and carve outs.
Information rights facilitate participatory governance because they allow parties to observe outcomes important to achieving impact and return.166

161
162
163
164
165

Geczy et al., supra note 24, at 699, 707–09.
Side Letter Doc. 26 (on file with authors).
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 2–4.
Geczy et al., supra note 24, at 709–10.
SEWARD & KISSELL LLP, supra note 54, at 3; de Fontenay and Nili, supra note 27,

at 39.
166

Geczy et al., supra note 24, at 707–08. The final grant report concludes that:
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If (a) any member of the LP Advisory Committee [or Fund]
determines that a Portfolio Company is in material breach of
any of the Integrity Requirements, or otherwise poses a material Integrity Risk, . . . [the fund] shall promptly: (i) notify
each of the members of the LP Advisory Committee, (ii) in
consultation with the LP Advisory Committee, require the
relevant Portfolio Company to undertake, within a specified
timeframe, remediation measures necessary or appropriate
to remedy such breach or mitigate such Integrity Risk, which
shall be approved by the LP Advisory Committee, and keep
the LP Advisory Committee regularly informed of the on-going implementation of those measures; . . . [or] dispose of the
Fund’s investment in such Portfolio Company on commercially reasonable terms, taking into account liquidity, market
constraints and fiduciary responsibilities . . . .167
Transparency of this kind is especially important in new and
evolving environments (like with impact investments), where
contracting parties need to be able to rely on trust and problem
solving.168 Confidentiality, on the other hand, keeps information
secret and separate. Many side letter confidentiality provisions,
however, create carve outs to share information. Carve outs shift
the directionality of confidentiality provisions, which are usually
written as barriers to transparency, oversight, and shared
knowledge.
Confidentiality provisions are a window into GP-LP dynamics. Confidentiality provisions shroud impact investments in secrecy with provisions like the following:
The Limited Partners acknowledge and agree that all information provided to them by or on behalf of the Fund or the
General Partner concerning the business of the Fund (including, without limitation, this Agreement and all amendments
hereto, the Private Placement Memorandum and the

[c]lauses range from special notices needing to be made to DFIs, to additional
transparency being granted to DFI advisory boards. DFIs are, as a result, in
receipt of information beyond what would be available to LPs in a traditional
private equity context, which stands to reason given that the use of public funds
to support private investment vehicles is in itself a departure from the norm . . . .
Jessica Jeffers et al., LP or Not LP: Confidentiality Clauses, Complexity, and Divergence
in Emerging Market Impact Funds 43 (March 31, 2021) (grant report on file with authors).
167 Side Letter Doc. 30 (on file with authors).
168 Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1383 (2010).
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Subscription Agreement), . . . shall not, without the prior
consent of the General Partner, be (i) disclosed . . . or (ii)
used . . . .169
That secrecy may make sense from a traditional GP’s perspective
of proprietary investment due diligence processes and pipelines.170 Secrecy, however, is at odds with promoting capital investment in impact funds. It also conflicts with transparency policies adopted by impact investors. Foundations and DFIs, in
particular, have stringent information needs in order to comply
with their own monitoring, reporting, and public disclosure
frameworks which require the ability to harvest and, in some
cases, disclose information to the public.171 Further, deal confidentiality can exacerbate consequences for all impact investors when
funds fail.172
Interviewees reported a growing tension between investors’
need and preference for transparency and GPs’ determination to
maintain secrecy. This tension is highest where impact investors
have lower bargaining power, such as in funds where DFIs or
foundations play a less dominant role in the investor base. GPs’
ability to push back is predicated on personal preferences for secrecy and the relatively lower need they have of DFI capital.173
Confidentiality provisions are common, but not uniform, in
substance, complexity, length, or even document location within
LPAs and side letters.
Preferences and information needs are also idiosyncratic to
each impact investor. For example, some impact investors have a
specific focus on business integrity, whereas others will be more
concerned about advancing policy initiatives or complying with
169

Side Letter Doc. 28 (on file with authors).

170

The confidentiality clauses themselves are becoming more stringent. The
grounds for this insistence on secrecy vary. Besides commercial reasons, the necessity to hide the role of individuals is often cited by GPs. This specific line of
argument should cause alarm among investors concerned with political and reputational risk. GPs know DFIs are in particular subject to access to information
obligations and therefore want to safeguard against information being made
publicly available as a result. This phenomenon is amplified as impact investors
and DFIs make additional demands for information.
Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 2.
171 See supra Section II.B.
172 “[B]eyond any opportunity costs linked to the resulting hinderance of fund-raising
efforts, confidentiality clauses have very damaging consequences when funds fail, as they
hinder the investors’ effort to remedy the situation.” Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 2.
173 Id.
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money laundering issues, resulting in clauses of varying length
and complexity.174 For DFIs, information needs are shaped by the
public role that they play and much of DFI-requested information
is for investment monitoring and risk management. Further,
DFIs may have to negotiate the inclusion of mandatory clauses
and language reflecting government policy preferences.175
Figure 5 shows that 47% of the side letters address confidentiality. For the remainder of this section, we report detailed
information about confidentiality provisions drawn from a
smaller subsample (twenty-five side letters) reviewed in conjunction with the previously mentioned grant. Some letters make the
agreements themselves confidential (16%) supporting the claim
of secret side deals.176 Over 90% address limited partner confidentiality obligations,177 whereas only 32% address general partner
confidentiality.178 GPs also negotiate for the right to keep information secret from investors (48%), in other words, to withhold
information (see Figure 8 below).179
Figure 9 shows the breakouts of withholding rights, with
low frequency for expected terms like “as required by law,” “nonpublic information about other investors,” or “trade secrets.” The
“other” clause is the most common category, demonstrating the
174

Id. at 3.

175

If so requested, the Manager shall promptly provide reasonable assistance to X
in respect of: (a) questions posed to X by [relevant government bodies] as part of
any enquiry by those bodies or other [relevant nation] or overseas government
bodies; and (b) any investigations made by either such body, provided that any
such question, enquiry or investigation relates to X’s commitment to [FUND].
Side Letter Doc. 2 (on file with authors).
176 See, e.g., Side Letter Doc. 28 (on file with authors) (making the terms of the agreement, investment, and fund information confidential).
177 See, e.g., Side Letter Doc. 38 (on file with authors).
178 “Any confidential information provided to the General Partner, the Investment
Advisor or the Partnership by the Limited Partners shall be kept confidential by the General Partner, the Investment Advisor and/or the Partnership, as applicable, and shall not
be disclosed to any third party . . . .” Side Letter Doc. 78 (on file with authors).
179

The General Partner shall have the right to keep confidential from the Limited
Partners (and their respective agents and attorneys) for such period of time as
the General Partner deems reasonable, any information that the General Partner reasonably believes to be in the nature of trade secrets or other information
the disclosure of which the General Partner in good faith believes is not in the
best interest of the Fund or any Portfolio Company or could damage the Fund or
such Portfolio Company or their respective businesses or which the Fund or such
Portfolio Company is required by law or by agreement with a third party to keep
confidential.
Side Letter Doc. 77 (on file with authors).
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degree of tailoring that occurs in side letters. Some of the “other”
provisions authorized managers to keep secret deal pipelines, negotiations, and even some financial distress cloistered from investors until the contract or default materialized.180

Figure 8: Additional confidentiality provisions

Figure 9: GP withholding rights

180 See, e.g., Side Letter Doc. 4 (on file with authors) (establishing that the GP can
withhold “information due to applicable legal restrictions, fiduciary responsibilities or confidentiality obligations that we are unable to avoid or waive”).
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Figure 10: LP and GP confidentiality terms

Side letters vary in content and complexity, something we observe with the confidentiality clauses. Explicit and implicit carveouts are common for both LPs and GPs. Figure 10 plots the frequency of LP (blue) and GP (red) carve outs in the documents.
Most of the recorded carveouts relate to legal compliance,181 sharing information within the investor’s network or organization,182
and sharing requirements under other side letters (i.e., MFNs).183
181

[A]s may be required to be included in any report, statement or testimony required to be submitted to any municipal, state or national regulatory body having jurisdiction over Partnership, the General Partner or any such Affiliate, (b)
as may be required in response to any summons or subpoena or in connection
with any litigation or similar proceeding, or (c) to the extent necessary to comply
with any law, order, regulation or rule applicable to the Partnership, the General
Partner or any such Affiliate or with any provision of the Partnership Agreement
or the Subscription Agreement.
Side Letter Doc. 28 (on file with authors).
182 See, e.g., Side Letter Doc. 78 (on file with authors) (carving out confidentiality obligations “where the disclosure . . . is to other Partners, to Associates and advisers of the
General Partner or the Investment Advisor, to the Auditors or to the Partnership’s lenders”).
183 See, e.g., Side Letter Doc. 10 (on file with authors) (promising investor had received
“all side letters or similar agreements (‘Side Letters’)” and promising to provide a copy of
any future side letters).
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Interestingly, the other category swamps the carveouts for both
LPs and GPs. We interpret this as evidence against boilerplate
and evidence of rote customization in side letters. While patterns
emerge about provision type, each document has its own idiosyncrasies in scope, content, and language.

Figure 11: Confidentiality provision length

Last, but not least, side letter variation in length and complexity can be observed by word counts. For example, Figure 11
shows variation in the length of confidentiality clauses and illustrates the potential costs associated with highly tailored, complex
contracting practices.
An important externality of confidentiality clauses, particularly in impact investing, is that they push agreements further
into the shadows. This secrecy engenders costs in two ways. Secrecy in the terms of the side letters creates hidden hierarchies of
investment rights, resulting in an asymmetry of information that
can threaten the efficiency of private ordering.184 The SEC cautions in its proposed side letter rules that:

184 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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An adviser may agree to provide preferential information
rights to a certain investor in exchange for something of benefit to the adviser. The proposed rule is designed to neutralize
the potential for private fund advisers to treat portfolio holdings information as a commodity to be used to gain or maintain favor with particular investors.185
Secrecy in the terms of the agreements also hampers efforts
to disseminate best practices that are still developing in the new
space of impact investing.
IV. DISCUSSION
Easterbrook and Fischel present contracts as a way for corporate actors to “write their own tickets,” or in other words, to
promise and deliver the value that they can offer. Side letters exemplify this phenomenon: they tailor terms of existing agreements to suit the specific needs of their parties. Side letters are
also ubiquitous in private market investments and, in particular,
in impact investing.
A. Side Letters as Contracts
Impact investing is a useful setting to understand the opportunities and costs of side letters as contracts because of the variety of backgrounds and mandates represented by multiple investors in this space, often within the same fund. For example, DFIs
represent government policy goals, and require greater transparency and accountability commensurate with their public policy
mandates.186 DFIs frequently invest alongside high net worth individuals, whose preferences are their own, and who lack the government accountability needs (as well as back-office capacity) of
DFIs. Other investors in impact investing include foundations,
pension funds, and other institutional investors. Side letters are
therefore critical tools to enable participants to dictate the terms
of their engagement, but they can also impose unique costs in a
still-developing space. In the rest of this section, we discuss these
opportunities and costs in light of our results, before concluding
with suggestions for a path forward.
We see evidence of “personalized contracts” in the lower frequency of co-investment rights and management fee reductions

185
186

72.

Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note 5, at 16,929.
See Development Finance Institutions and Private Sector Development, supra note
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in impact versus non-impact side letters.187 At the same time, impact side letters place greater emphasis on information rights and
advisory committees especially compared to non-impact counterparts.188 Side letter terms reflect investor priorities, which, in impact investing, center comparatively more on the nonpecuniary
achievements of the fund. For readers interested in the development of impact investing generally, the prevalence and strength
of impact-oriented provisions in the side letters attest to the overall growth and maturation of impact investing.189
Side letter provisions clearly answer investor needs. For example, advisory committees are governance tools responsive to
the fixed investment horizon of funds (typically 10 years). Advisory committees facilitate continued oversight and engagement
even after investor capital commitments are locked in. At the
same time, not all investors have the desire or capacity to participate in advisory committees, and we see this manifest in the fact
that advisory committees are negotiated in side letters that secure rights for some but not all investors. Moreover, we see contracts guaranteeing advisory committee seats, so advisory committee rights are not only widespread, but robust. We also do not
see a single defined goal for advisory committees, but instead observe a variety of roles. In other words, advisory committee terms
are not boilerplate; rather, they reflect the particular needs of
specific investors.
The prevalence of information rights in impact side letters is
another manifestation of tailoring provisions to specific investor
needs. Information rights are the most common provision contracted for in our sample. In interviews, fund managers reported
a reluctance to share the same detail of investment information
with small investors compared to large investors, for a variety of
reasons: small investors tend to be less well-known to fund managers due to fewer repeated interactions, and they are perceived
as having lower reputational skin-in-the-game and smaller backoffice compliance capabilities to ensure confidentiality is

187 A 2019/20 study found 46% of side letters contain fee discounts. SEWARD &
KISSELL LLP, supra note 54, at 3. A 2015 Preqin study found that 69% of GPs surveyed
offered co-investment rights to certain investors. PREQIN, PRIVATE EQUITY COINVESTMENT OUTLOOK, supra note 59, at 5.
188 See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text.
189 For further reading on impact investing, see Geczy et al., supra note 24; Brad Barber et al., Impact Investing, 139 J. FIN. ECON. 162 (2021).
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maintained.190 Many small investors also do not have the same
requirement for transparency that large investors like DFIs and
foundations have, due to these agencies’ public regulation.
We even see side letters negotiate rights for GPs to withhold
information from LPs such as deal pipelines, financial distress of
a portfolio company, or information required by law. Side letter
agreements make it possible for information rights to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, in the spirit of Easterbrook and
Fischel’s “writing your own ticket” philosophy.191
B. Costs of Side Letter Contracting
Our findings demonstrate the roles of contract tailoring via
side letters, but they also reveal potential costs. First, the direct
costs of side letter negotiation and execution are recouped from
committed capital, meaning that increasing transaction costs reduce funds deployed for impact. Funds have little incentive to curtail a practice that appeases and lures important investors without the fund footing the bill beyond byzantine compliance
obligations.
Second, side letters are shadow contracts that modify investment agreement terms, often outside of the view of all investors.
They create a hidden hierarchy of investment rights,192 a concern
that has captured the attention of the SEC.193 For example, common side letter provisions include terms that protect investors’
return, such as MFNs. These provisions are only available to investors with the negotiated side letter right, yet they affect all
investors in practice when invoked. The resulting hierarchy is
hidden by virtue of being placed within side letters rather than
within the main formation documents (e.g., the LPA). Other investors do not necessarily have rights to view these side letters.
In this way, the use of side letters and of confidentiality provisions can also hamper the sharing of best practices and evolution of best-in-class impact deal terms. It is not just that side letters remove incentives to strike the best bargain in LPAs, but
additional measures of confidentiality keep contractual innovations secret. Investors do not even know to ask for certain rights
or benefits that are reserved for the select few. Only insiders
190 Interview participants discussed the lack of trust in private investors to comply
and keep information confidential. Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note
47, at 4–5.
191 Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Contract, supra note 12, at 1417–18.
192 Qualitative Interview Session 1 Summary, supra note 47, at 5.
193 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RISK ALERT, supra note 61.
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know where they can order “off the menu,” and what they may
request.
Nonetheless, as we have seen, side letters serve a necessary
role in spanning the gap between private market and public policy objectives. Large investors use side letters to renegotiate aspects of the investment contract and seek idiosyncratic provisions
that are often tied to the goals of the backing foundation or government agency. This is most clear on the subset of confidentiality
obligations where DFIs and foundations contractually embed
oversight and reporting obligations as well as restrict manager
discretion through prohibited investments (i.e., forced labor or
outside of target regions). But shielding information from markets and the general public is counter to the public policy mandates of the government-backed investors and foundations perpetuating these practices.
Third, side letters also generate externalities from the complexity that they create. Our empirical analysis reveals a patchwork of terms with ample carve outs and little standardization
that only lawyers could navigate. For example, “other” terms are
the most frequent when it comes to analyzing confidentiality
rights for both LPs and GPs, and the average level and variation
of confidentiality clause length belies the notion of boilerplate language. Yet boilerplate not only establishes common understanding, but also reduces the need for negotiation and interpretation.194 Lack of standardization, as we see in our sample of side
letters, introduces small transaction costs that add up, from negotiation, to compliance, to interpretation in the event of a default. While side letters exhibit great variation and are used to
address idiosyncratic investor needs, common themes emerge in
reviewing side letters, particularly with respect to information
rights, advisory committees, and confidentiality. Common side
letter themes should be more robustly addressed in the LPA and
leave the side letters to handle truly bespoke terms. Provisions
that are crucial to documenting impact and resolving profit/purpose tensions should be negotiated and documented in the LPA to
develop impact-specific best practices, and not be left in the shadows of side letters. Our case study highlights opportunities to improve the existing private ordering approaches through

194 Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 107–08, 110–12, 115–19 (2000) (discussing why contracts, in real life, are often simple and not complex because it reduces negotiation costs,
increases trust and reputation, and decreases monitoring costs).
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standardization.195 In a related ongoing project, we propose a
standardization menu as a starting point for negotiations to
streamline the process, disrupt path dependency on out-of-date
templates, and reduce the scope of negotiation.196 Further, compliance with common laws like know-your-client, tax obligations,
and PRI compliance should be addressed in standardized provisions of the subscription agreement. All remaining, truly bespoke
issues can be resolved in side letters, and, consistent with the proposed SEC Rules,197 those side letters should be disclosed to all
current and future investors. Hierarchies created by contract are
a natural feature of private ordering, but investors should not be
subject to surprise terms that reshape investment rights or
risks.198 Additionally, moving common side provisions to the main
agreements would comply with proposed SEC prohibitions on
preferential information and liquidity terms in side letters.199
C. Writing your own “ticket” on impact
Zooming out from the contents of our study and extending our
findings to impact investing more broadly, we interpret our results as further evidence that the insertion of impact shapes private market investing in unique ways.200 Impact objectives are evident in information and reporting goals, as well as compliance
provisions. Impact goals may also motivate the heightened need
for participatory governance, like provisions guaranteeing investors a seat on an advisory committee.
In studies like this one and in other work, we observe how
impact seeps into the fabric of agreements and alters the networks of contract terms.201 Impact is not bolted on as an afterthought, but it appears to be an integral negotiation point for parties.

195 See Qualitative Interview Session 2 Summary, supra note 108, at 2 (To generate
the menu approach, we reviewed standardization efforts in private equity and related
fields such as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Master Agreement 2002, created in 1985 and subsequently regularly updated.); Model Limited Partnership Agreement, INST. P’SHIP ASS’N, https://perma.cc/UXG7-2SL4 (last visited Feb. 11,
2022) (The Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA) also produces a set of model
private equity investment documents.).
196 See Jeffers et al., supra note 166, at 34–41.
197 Proposed Private Fund Rules, supra note 5, at 16,886.
198 Id. at 167 (asserting that the rules related to information and disclosure would
“curtail activity that harms investors”).
199 Id. at 1.
200 Geczy et al., supra note 24, at 709–10.
201 Id.
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Several aspects of the project connect with foundational theories in corporate law, some in surprising ways. Easterbrook and
Fischel noted that contracts contain endless variations because
objectives, motivations, and outcomes under a contract are infinite.202 They saw variation and tailoring as a feature of corporate
law achieved through contracts, not as a bug. Our analysis reveals that impact investing is a particularly apt setting for tailored contracts. Lack of boilerplate and documented variation in
length and complexity of side letter provisions bolster their point
about the endless creative solutions that live in contracting.
Easterbrook and Fischel may also interpret the side letters in the
case study as clever, targeted interventions to balance power and
informational needs, not as shadow contracts that hide important
negotiations.
While Easterbrook and Fischel looked positively on contract
variation, tailoring, and the role of private ordering, they did not
look as favorably on corporate social responsibility as a whole.203
They cautioned: “A manager told to serve two masters (a little for
equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both
and is answerable to neither.”204 Perhaps they viewed the transaction costs as an insurmountable obstacle: that profits would be
eroded by pursuing purpose, and in contracting around it.205 In
impact investing, however, foundation and DFI money are cornerstone capital. The usual guardrails of transaction costs to curb
customization soften in the face of large resources these investors
have to pursue social objectives.206
For all their skepticism about the value of dual objectives,
Easterbrook and Fischel imagined a world of infinite motivations
and tailoring to parties’ idiosyncratic needs. They saw contracts
as a means, even, to agree on pursuing purpose over (or alongside)
profit. “If a bank is formed [for] the declared purpose of giving
priority to loans to minority-owned businesses or third-world nations, that is a matter for the ventures to settle among

202

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 2–4.
“Wealthy firms provide better working conditions and clean up their outfalls; high
profits produce social wealth that strengthens the demand for cleanliness. Environmental
concerns are luxury goods; wealthy societies purchase much cleaner and healthier environments than do poorer nations . . . in part because they can afford to pay for it.” Id. at
38.
204 Id.
205 “Faced with a demand from either group, the manager can appeal to the interests
of the other. Agency costs rise and social wealth falls.” Id.
206 Clayton, supra note 4, at 105, 109–10.
203

306

The University of Chicago Business Law Review

[Vol. 1:259

themselves.”207 Venturers are, in fact, settling the matter for
themselves. Impact agreements resolve the indeterminate nature
of a stakeholder governance framework (a manager serving two
masters serves neither) because the community’s interests are
the equity holders’ interests. Further, the contract reflects the equity holder’s unique preferences and priority about which community interests to serve and how to deliver on these promises.
The preferences are recorded in the contract and become an enforceable term of the deal. Private ordering, not corporate law,
enables agents to serve two masters or two goals: profit and purpose. Our only quibble is how frequently the contract of choice is
the side letter and not the LPA or subscription agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
We introduce a unique data set of side letters and impact investor interviews. These shadow contracts memorialize side deals
between some, but not all investors. With our data, we document
motivations for large investors to seek side letters and the most
common terms of these side letters. We use our case study to identify the opportunities, like tailoring, and costs, like patchwork
compliance, of side letters.
We also treat our data as a window into contract and corporate law theories. Contracts are central to promising and delivering what investors value—an emphasis that takes on new meaning as economies start to grapple with societal issues through
dual purpose vehicles such as impact investing funds. Side letters
are particularly useful tools to define value for large impact investors, specifically as it relates to impact monitoring and reporting. Side letters thus solve one problem specific to the investor,
but they introduce other less concrete harms such as hidden hierarchies and suboptimal LPA terms. Standardizing the LPA and
subscription agreement to address common side letter provisions
would develop best practices in impact deals, increase transparency, and streamline side letter negotiation and compliance. Disclosure of any remaining side letters would also be consistent with
proposed SEC rules on side letters in private market funds.

207

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 36.

